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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CLAIMANTS WHO ARE MEMBERS OF TEAMSTERS, 
CHAUFFEURS AND HELPERS OF AMERICA 
Plaintiff, 
vs. Case No. 16690 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW, THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSON OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF 
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, and THE INTERMOUNTAIN 
OPERATORS LEAGUE, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellants, local unions 222 and 976, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
Chauffers, and Helpers of America, represent members of those two unions who filed 
claims for benefits for the period commencing with the 1st day of April, 1979, and 
ending the 14th day of April, 1979. These claimants where denied benefits because it 
was determined that their unemployment was due to a stoppage of work which existed 
because of a strike at the establishments of their employers which involved their grade, 
class or group. The claimants, through their authorized representatives, the aforesaid 
local unions 222 and 976, filed a written appeal from this determination of the 
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Department Representative. The matter was duly heard by the Appeal Referee, who, on 
the 6th day of July, 1979, affirmed the decision of the Department Representative. 
Claimants, again through their union representatives, appealed to the Board of Review 
of the Industrial Commission. On the 21st day of August, 1979, by a majority decision, 
the Board of Review upheld the decision of the Appeal Referee and the Department 
Representative. The matter is now before this court on a petition for review filed by the 
claimants through their unions, pursuant to Section 35-4-10(i), Utah Code Annotated 
1953. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents Board of Review and Department of Employment Security agree 
substantially with Appellants' Statement of Facts with respect to the identity of the 
parties involved in this appeal, their relation to each other and the facts leading up to 
the commencement of negotiations between Trucking Management, Inc. (TMI), 
representing approximately 2,700 employers (R.000135), although it may have been as 
few as 350 (R.00077). and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, representing 
through its National Freight Industry Negotiating Committee its affiliated local unions. 
Appellants have included a number of conclusions and assertions in their Statement of 
Facts concerning the circumstances which led up to the strike. Because those 
conclusions and assertions are not necessarily supported by the record, the following 
summary is offered: 
In 1976, the parties successfully negotiated a National Master Freight Agreements 
to cover the period from 1976 to 1979. (R.00060, 000131, 000135, 00140) It was due to 
expire at midnight, March 31, 1979 (R.000140). On December 11, 1978, I BT notified the 
employers of its desire to revise or change terms or conditions of the National Master 
Freight Agreement and all area, regional, and local supplements. (R.00068) 
2 
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The Agreement clearly establishes that the parties constitute a single multi-union, 
multi-employer collective bargaining unit. (R.00072) 
Negotiations between TMI and the National Freight Industry Negotiating Commit-
tee of the I BT began on January 23, 1979, (R.00131) and continued to March 31, 1979. 
(R.00142) On March 31, 1979, the national committee of the IBT notified TMI that it had 
determined to take economic action in support of its demands of all employers. 
commencing at midnight March 31, 1979. (R.00071; R.00123, 00124, 00125) On the 
same day TMI notified the IBT that any attempt to deal with the employers individually 
would be considered adverse to the integrity of the multi-employer bargaining unit. 
(R.00061) 
Economic sanction was in the form of a strike against selected employers. 
(R.00077, 00125 - 00130) Only the National Freight Industry Negotiating Committee 
of the IBT could determine which employers would be struck. (R.00125, 00126) In Utah 
the employers struck were Consolidated Freightways, Garrett, Illinois; California 
Express; and Pacific I ntermountain Express. (R.00128, 00129, 00131) After commence-
ment of the strike by IBT, TMI determined to initiate a defensive shutdown of the other 
employers. (R.00059) In response to TM l's instruction, IML engaged their defensive 
shutdown. (00167) Consolidated Freightways also engaged in a defensive shutdown 
in response to TM l's instruction, but only after pickets were established at their plant. 
(R.00073, 00074,00104, 00157, 00158) 
The purpose of limiting the economic action to a selective strike against only 
certain employers was to avoid a Taft-Hartley injunction. (R.00125) Although "interim 
agreements" were offered by IBT to many employers, those agreements contained 
terms parallelling the demands of the I BT as of March 31, 1979, and did not constitute 
an offer to continue working under the prior contract until a new settlement could be 
reached. (R00105 through R.00122) 
3 
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The objective of the strike initiated by the IBT was to gain wage and benefit 
improvements for all employees covered by the National Master Freight Agreement 
(R.00160) 
Settlement was reached between the IBT and the employers on April 10, 1979, and 
the IBT pickets were removed. However, the work stoppage continued until April 14, 
1979, when the Machinists' Unions removed their pickets and the Teamsters returned 
to work. (R.00131, 00159) 
POINTI 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW AND THE APPEAL REFEREE DID NOT ERR IN 
DENYING BENEFITS TO THE CLAIMANTS WHO WENT ON STRIKE 
Appellants contend that the Board of Review and the Appeal Referee erred in not 
looking behind the strike to the reasons why the I BT felt it was necessary to call the 
strike. They assert on appeal that the strike was compelled by the bad faith bargaining 
ofTMI. 
This court has previously held that the party which first resorts to work stoppage 
will be held responsible in determining eligibility for unemployment compensation. 
Olaf Nelson Construction Co. v. Industrial Commission, 121 Utah 525, 243 P. 2d 951 
(1952); Kennecott Copper Corporation Employees v. Department of Employment 
Security, 13 Ut. 2d 262, 372 P. 2d 987 (1962). By implication, this court has concluded 
that the Industrial Commission must consider the facts underlying any decision to 
engage in a strike or lockout. Members of lronworkers' Union of Provo v. Industrial 
Commission, (Utah, 1943) 139 P. 2d 208; Olaf Nelson Construction Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, supra, citing at p. 956 Bunny's Waffle Shoe v. California Employment 
Commission, 24 Cal. 2d 735, 151 P. 2d 224. 
4 
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Appellants rest their assertion of bad faith bargaining on an affidavit of an IBT 
attorney which contained only a conclusion of bad faith bargaining, but failed to set 
forth any facts in support of that cone I usion other than a general statement that the last 
economic proposal of the industry were inadequate in the opinion of the union. 
(R.00102) The employers, on the other hand, asserted that their last offer prior to the 
strike was the maximum permitted under President Carter's pay standards. (R.00059) 
Based upon such evidence the Appeal Referee properly concluded that the facts failed 
to show that the employers' representatives refused or failed to bargain with the union. 
In so holding, the Appeal Referee said: 
The conclusion as to good faith can only be drawn from the facts in regard to 
what took place during the period of negotiations. Lack of good faith cannot 
be shown merely by a refusal to grant all requests and meet all demands. It is 
well understood that reasonable and well-intentioned men will differ where 
their various interests are in opposition. (R.00029) 
Appellants content that another cause of the strike was government interference in 
the collective bargaining processes. (Appellants' Brief, page 9) Appellants again rely 
on the Affidavit of the Union attorney (R.00102) and a copy of the International 
Teamster, an IBT publication. (R.00075 - 00077) However, by Appellants' own 
admission government involvement was limited to asserting that labor abide by 
President Carter's Voluntary Wage and Price Guidelines, which labor was unwilling to 
do. (See Appellants' Brief, page 11) No credible evidence was offered by Appellants to 
show that government involvement in fact compelled the IBT to strike. 
The finding of the Appeal Referee that the selective strike constituted economic 
action against all employers is supported by substantial competent evidence. Not only 
were the negotiations carried on betweeen all of the employers and unions acting as a 
single collective bargaining unit, (R.00072) but the negotiations centered on improved 
wages and benefits for all employees covered by the National Master Freight 
5 
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Agreement. (R 00071. 00123 - 00125) The wage and benefit package finally agreed 
upon did in fact benefit all employees so covered without regard to which employers 
were struck, as will be more fully discussed in Point II hereof. 
POINT II 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW AND APPEAL REFEREE DID NOT ERR IN 
DENYING BENEFITS TO THOSE CLAIMANTS LOCKED OUT BY THEIR 
EMPLOYERS. 
Appellant contends that management was the real and fundamental cause of the 
work stoppage, at least with respect to the employees of I ML and CF. However. by 
Appellant's own admission CF was first struck by the union on April 1, before any 
lockout occurred. (Appellant's Brief, page 13). CF was on the list of employers to be 
struck on April 1, 1979. (R.00127, 00128) and, in fact, it was the first employer in Utah at 
which picket lines were established. (R.00146, 00157, 00158) The order to strike was 
received in Utah by the local Teamsters union about 2:00a.m. on April 1. (R.00146) The 
picketing of CF occurred before CF notified Local 222 of its intent to engage in a 
defensive shutdown (R.00158) which notice wasn't issued by CF until 9:45 p.m. on April 
1, 1979. (R.00104) Thus, there can be no question that the labor union initiated the use 
of economic sanctions against CF. 
On the other hand, the facts are clear that IML was not struck by the union. 
However, after it received notice from TMI that a selective strike had been called 
against some of the employers IML commenced a defensive shutdown pursuant to 
instructions from TMI. (R.00167) 
"Appellant challenges the right to the employer group represented by TMI, 
including IML, to consider a strike against one as a strike against all. This court faced 
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that very question in the case of Olaf Nelson Construction Co. v. Industrial Commis-
sion. supra and concluded: 
Our conclusion in this case is that the sounder view is to recognize these 
large scale bargaining units as the groups involved within the meaning of the 
Employment Security Act. Both labor and management have seen fit to resort 
to such a device for a uniform, expedient means of negotiating their 
agreements. There is no dispute that the economic sanction of the A.F. of L. in 
this case was directed against the entire employer association. The strike was 
called for and on behalf of every employee covered by the agreement. It 
therefore directly involved all these claimants, at each particular place of 
employment at which they were last employed. The strike was fomented by 
claimants through their duly authorized union representatives. They are 
members of the group which gained a raise in wages because of the strike and 
are parties to the scheme or plan to foment it. (243 P. 2d, at p. 959) 
In accord with the above is this court's decision in the case of Teamsters, 
Chauffers, etc. v. Orange Transportation Company, et al, 5 Ut. 2d 45, 296 P. 2d 291 
(1956), involving the same union and some of the same employers. The court there 
held: 
Our review of the record, as outlined above, indicates that there was evidence 
from which Appeals Referee could find that the action of the Union was aimed 
at the lntermountain Operator's League as a group with which it was 
negotiating, that Orange and Inland were members of that group, and that the 
strike was initiated for the purpose of forcing capitulation of all members of the 
Employers' Group. Such findings may not be disturbed by this court so long as 
they are supported by substantial evidence. (296 P. 2d, at p. 294) 
Respondents readily concede that in order for the disqualification to apply to IML 
employees there must be an affirmative showing that the group is engaged in a plan of 
concerted action and that the action is in fact done for the group as part of the plan. 
Teamsters, Chauffers, etc., v. Board of Review, etc., 10 Ut. 2d 63, 348 P. 2d 558, 561 
(1960). 
Appellant argues there is no evidence that a strike against one employer was a 
strike against all. (Appellant's Brief, page 11) Yet, Appellant agrees that for a number of 
7 
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years the Teamsters and the lntermounta1n Operators League have been parties 1n 
their representative capacities to the 1976 - 1979 National Master Freight Agreement 
and that negotiations for modification of the Agreement were undertaken by the 
parties, through their representatives, on a national basis. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 2, 3; 
R.00068; 00140, 00141) By virtue of the terms contained in the National Master Freight 
Agreement the employees, through their unions, constitute one bargaining unit, and 
the employers and their associations constitute a single national multi-employer 
bargaining unit. (R.00072) The negotiations on behalf of the employees was under the 
direct and exclusive control of the National Freight Industry Negotiating Committee of 
the IBT, (R.00155) and only the national committee of the I BT could determine whether 
to take economic action and the nature of such action. (R.00125) 
As shown from testimony in the hearing, a uniform settlement was eventually 
reached by the parties, which applied to all of the carriers: 
Fullmer: 
Haslam: 
Fullmer: 
Haslam: 
Fullmer: 
Haslam: 
Isn't it a fact, Mr. Haslam, that the ultimate settlement of the 1979 
National Negotiations resulted in an economic package which 
was applied uniformly to all of the carriers by that agreement? 
That is true. 
And that your members were working for Garrett, P.1.E., Consoli-
dated Freightways, ICX, received the same wage increases as 
employees working at IML Freight? 
That is correct. 
And it was the intention of the Union Negotiating Committee 
throughout, that a uniform settlement be achieved, isn't that 
true? 
Well, naturally because of the ... that's what it's always been, labor. 
(R.00160) 
Appellants' contention that the employers were at fault or caused the strike by not 
signing the Interim Agreement is wholly without merit. The great majority of courts of 
th . o~~ e various states have consistently hel<Ji.hat an employer or labor group which offers 
to continue working under an old contract pending settlement of a new contract will not 
8 
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be responsible if the other party refuses to accept the offer. Cases on this subject ara 
collected at 62 ALR 3rd 437. and 63 ALR 3rd 88. 
POINT Ill 
THE DECISION OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW DENYING UNEMPLOYMENT 
BENEFITS IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF APPELLANTS' RIGHT TO EQUAL 
PROTECTION UNDER THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH OR 
THE UNITED STATES 
Appellants contend the volitional test as employed in the decision of the Appeal 
Referee violates the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Constitutions of 
the State of Utah and of the United States on three grounds. 
First, Appellants contend the volitional test is arbitrary and unrelated to the object 
of unemployment compensation legislation. Second, the volitional test is unsuscep-
tible of definition or proof. Third, the volitional test violates public policy. 
The volitional test is not set forth in the Utah Employment Security Act. However, 
contrary to Appellants' assertion that it is a judicial invention, the volitional test has its 
genesis in the Social Security Amendments of 1935, which established the basis for the 
unemployment compensation system now existing in every state. The essence of the 
unemployment compensation system was set forth by the Senate Finance Committee, 
which stated: 
"The essential idea in unemployment compensation is the creation of reserves 
during periods of employment from which compensation is paid to workmen 
who lose their positions when employment slackens and who cannot find 
other work. Unemployment compensation differs from relief in that payments 
are made as a matter of right, not on a needs basis, but only while the worker is 
involuntarily unemployed. In all compensation systems the period during 
which compensation is payable is limited in some relation to the previous 
period of employment. Invariably there is a waiting period immediately 
following unemployment during which no compensation is payable. There-
after, compensation is paid at a stated percentage of the previous wage, 
9 
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customarily with both a minimum and a maximum rate. Payment of compen-
sation is conditioned upon continued involuntary unemployment Benefi-
ciaries must accept suitable employment offered them or lose their right to 
compensation. After a specified period of time the compensation 1s d1scont1n-
ued in any event." (Senate Report No. 628, 7 4th Congress, 1st Session, p. 11) 
This court has previously held that the purpose of the Employment Security Act is 
to assist the worker and his family in times when he is out of work without fault on his 
part. Kennecott Copper Corporation Employees v. Department of Employment 
Security, 13 U. 2d 262, 372 P. 2d 987 (1962). Specifically, the declared public policy of 
the statute is to establish financial reserves for the benefit of persons unemployed 
through no fault of their own. Olaf Nelson Construction Co. v. Industrial Commission, 
121 U. 525, 243 P. 2d 951 ( 1952). Th us it is evident that the volitional test is not arbitrary 
and that is is directly related to the purposes of the statute. 
The volitional test in the context of a labor dispute has been simply defined: 
" ... the one who first resorts to the use of work stoppage as a means of putting 
on economic pressure to settle such a dispute must bear the responsibility 
therefor." Kennecott Copper Corporation Employees v. Department of Employ-
ment Security, supra, at 372 P. 2d, p. 989. 
The reasoning underlying this definition of volition and its application in issues of 
labor dispute was succinctly explained by the court in its Kennecott decison: 
Only by fixing responsibility in this way can the interest of all parties and of 
society be properly protected. The Employment Security Act was designed to 
ease the burdens of unemployment and multifarious evils which ramify from it. 
Its primary purpose is to assist the worker and his family in times when, 
without fault on his part, he is out of work. The secondary purpose is to provide 
stability for the general economy by assuring continuity of purchasing power. 
It is plainly apparent from the Act that it was not intended to be used as a 
weapon in labor strife. (Id, at p. 990) Undoubtedly one of the considerations 
prompting the prohibition against workers receiving benefits for unemploy-
ment resulting from being involved in a strike is the fact that it would be unfair 
to use funds built up by labor and management jointly to support labor in a 
co~t~st wherein it was exerting economic pressure against management by 
striking or by participating in or supporting a strike so that it was in fact 
involved therein. (372 P. 2d, at p. 990) 
10 
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The above quoted statement finds considerable similarity in the decision of the 
U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Ohio Bureau of Employment Service v. Hodory, 431 
U.S 471, 52 L. Ed. 2d 513, 97 S. Ct. 1898 (1977). The claimant, Hodory, was employed 
in Ohio by US. Steel at one of its steel production plants. When the plant's coal supply 
was curtailed by a coalminers' strike at a mine owned by U.S. Steel, the claimant was 
laid off. The Ohio Bureau of Employment Service denied benefits to the claimant under 
a provision in the Ohio unemployment law which disqualified all individuals whose 
unemployment arises from a strike at any plant or establishment owned by the 
employer. The claimant filed suit in federal district court on the theory that his 
unemployment was involuntary and the denial of benefits was therefore in violation of 
the Equal Protection clause. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision of the 
district court and held the denial of benefits to be constitutional. In so doing the court 
looked beyond the effect of the law solely on the recipient and explained: 
Appellee thus focuses on the interests of the recipient of unemployment 
compensation. 
The unemployment compensation statute, however, touches upon more 
than just the recipient. It provides for the creation of a fund produced by 
contributions from private employers. The rate of an employer's contribution 
to the fund varies according to benefits paid to that employer's eligible 
employees. Ohio Rev Code Ann §4141.25 (1973). Any action with regard to 
disbursements from the unemployment compensation fund thus will affect 
both the employer and the fiscal integrity of the fund. Appel lee in effect urges 
that the court consider only the needs of the employee seeking compensation. 
The decision of the weight to be given the various effects of the statute, 
however, is a legislative decision, and appellee's position is contrary to the 
principle that "the Fourteenth Amendment gives the federal courts no power 
to impose upon the states their views of what constitutes wise economic or 
social policy." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486, 25 L. Ed. 2d 491, 90 S. 
Ct. 1153 (1970) 
In considering the constitutionality of the statute, therefore, the court must 
view its consequences, not only for the recipient of benefits, but also for the 
contributors to the fund and for the fiscal integrity of the fund. (52 L. Ed. 2d, p. 
528) 
In determining whether or not the Ohio disqualification provision has a rational 
relation to a legitimate state interest, the court concluded: 
11 
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Although the District Court was reacting to appellants' own hyperbole 1n 
speaking of financial crises and bankruptcy, it must be recognized that effects 
less than pushing the employer to bankruptcy may be rnt1onally viewed as 
undesirable. The employer's costs go up with every laid-off worker who 1s 
qualified to collect unemployment. The only way for the employer to stop 
these rising costs is to settle the strike so as to return the employees to work. 
Qualification for unemployment compensation thus acts as a lever increasing 
the pressures on an employer to settle a strike. The state has chosen to leave 
this lever in existence for situations in which the employer has locked out his 
employees, but to eliminate it if the union has made the strike move. 
Regardless of our views of the wisdom or lack of wisdom of this form of state 
"neutrality" in labor disputes, we cannot say that the approach taken by Ohio 
is irrational. (Id, at p. 529) 
Although Utah does not charge back to employers the benefits paid their former 
employees for purposes of determining the employer's contribution rate, the relation of 
the court's analysis to that of Mr. Justice Crockett in the Kennecott case is obvious and 
needs no further comment. 
The Hodory decision clearly confirms the right of each state to determine its own 
approach to the labor dispute issue, so long as the approach selected has a rational 
relation to a state interest. The Hodory holding was reaffirmed in the more recent 
decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in New York Telephone Company, et al., v. New 
York State Department of Labor, et al., 440 U.S. 519, 59 L. Ed. 2d 553, 99 S. Ct. 1328 
(1979). In upholding the allowance of unemployment benefits to workers on strike, the 
court said: 
"The voluminous history of the Social Security Act made it abundantly clear 
that Congress intended the several states to have broad freedom in setting up 
the types of unemployment compensation they wish. 
It is clear from the holdings of the Kennecott and Hodory decisions that the 
volitional test, as applied to labor disputes, has a rational relation to the purposes of the 
Employment Security Act, and is not therefore violative of the Equal Protection clause. 
Appellants' contention that the volitional test is not susceptible to proof by the 
parties is totally without merit. The labor unions and management have a unique 
insight into what transpires in such negotiating sessions and, therefore, are best able to 
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provide meaningful evidence on the questions of which party first initiated the use of 
economic sanctions and the reasons therefor. The Olaf Nelson decision has been a 
matter of public record for approximately 26 years. Both labor and management are or 
should be well aware of its requirements in proving which party is at fault for initiating 
the use of economic sanctions. Both parties are well aware of the refining of the Nelson 
requirements by the decisions of this court in Teamsters, Chauffer's, Etc. v. Orange 
Transportation Company, 5 Ut. 2d 45, 296 P. 2d 291 (1956) and Teamsters, Chauffers, 
Etc. v. Board of Review, 10 Ut. 2d 63, 348 P. 2d 558 ( 1960), which cases involved these 
same litigants. Both parties are sufficiently privy to the actions of their representatives 
in the negotiations that it is within their power to provide proper evidence for the 
administrative hearing. The volitional test is not based upon assumption or presump-
tion, but only upon the evidence presented by the parties and the resultant facts as 
determined by the Appeal Referee. 
The volitional test is clearly consistent with the public policy underlying the 
Employment Security Act, as stated in the prior pronouncements of this court cited at 
the beginning of this Point 111. It is also consistent with the public policy of the state as to 
employment relations and collective bargaining, which recognizes the three major 
interests involved: the public, the employee and the employer, and which concludes 
that: 
Industrial peace. regular and adequate income for the employee, and 
uninterrupted production of goods and services are promotive of all of these 
interests. (Section 34-20-1 (2), U.C.A. 1953.) 
The final point of Appellants' Equal Protection argument is that unemployment 
benefits were denied to the claimants on the basis of their union membership. The 
Referee concluded, however, that all claimants in the case were unemployed due to a 
stoppage of work involving their grade, class or group. (R.00031) There is no evidence 
whatsoever that any claimant was denied benefits because of union membership. 
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POINT IV 
THE DECISION OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW DENYING UNEMPLOYMENT 
BENEFITS IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF APPELLANTS' RIGHT TO DUE 
PROCESS UNDER THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH OR 
THE UNITED STATES. 
Appellants suggest that use of the volitional test constitutes a denial of due process 
on the grounds that it is based on a presumption having no rational basis in fact. 
Apparently, the presumption referred to by Appellants is that of fault. However, by 
definition he who first resorts to the use of economic sanctions is considered at fault. 
The Appeal Referee specifically found that labor was the first to engage in a work 
stoppage, and that the economic sanction thus employed was directed against all of 
the employers for the benefit of all workers represented by the union and thereby party 
to the National Master Freight Agreement. 
Appellants also allege they were denied a meaningful hearing in that the Appeal 
Referee did not rule on the questions of constitutionality raised by Appellants. In 
affirming the denial of benefits the Referee in effect refused to find the statute 
unconstitutional. The refusal is proper in that such a finding could only be tentative at 
best and only the courts can make a binding decision on a question of law. Utah Hotel 
Co. v. Industrial Commission, et al., (Utah, 1944) 151 P. 2d 467, 470. There is no denial 
of due process in such a procedure because Appellants have a meaningful remedy in 
their right of review by this court, where a binding decision can be made. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants became unemployed on April 1, 1979, due to a stoppage of work which 
resulted from a strike of the grade, class or group to which they belonged. The strike 
was selective against only some of the employers involved in negotiations over a new 
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National Master Freight Agreement, but was undertaken as part of a concerted plan of 
action directed against all employers on behalf of every employee covered by the 
agreement. The use of the volitional test in labor dispute cases is rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest-that is, the payment of unemployment benefits to claimants 
who are unemployed through no fault of their own. Under the facts of this case the 
claimants were properly denied benefits and the decision of the Board of Review 
should be affirmed. 
ROBERT B. HANSEN, 
Attorney General 
FLOYD G. ASTIN 
K. ALLAN ZABEL 
Special Assistants 
Attorney General 
K. Allan Zabel 
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